Ohio Tort Reform in 1998:  The War Continues by Werber, Stephen J.
Cleveland State University 
EngagedScholarship@CSU 
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship 
1997 
Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War Continues 
Stephen J. Werber 
Cleveland State University, s.werber@csuohio.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles 
 Part of the Legislation Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts 
Commons 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
Original Citation 
Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War Continues, 45 Cleveland State Law Review 539 
(1997) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of 
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu. 
Citation: 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 539 1997 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Thu May  3 10:47:50 2012
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
OHIO TORT REFORM IN 1998: THE WAR CONTINUES
STEPHEN J. WERBER 1
I. THE CULMINATING BATITLE - STATE EX REL. OHIO ACADEMY
OF TRIAL LAWYERS V. SHEWARD ........................ 539
II. THE ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT PRODUCT DESIGN - CARREL
v. ALLIED PRODUCTS CORPORATION ...................... 542
A. Background .................................. 542
B. A Brief Foray: The Constitutional Issues ........... 546
C. The Holdings ................................. 549
1. In the Ohio Court of Appeals ................ 549
2. In the Ohio Supreme Court ................. 550
D. Misuse of McAuliffe ........................... 557
E. Assumption of the Risk ......................... 560
III. A NEW WRONGFUL DEATH ACT - COLLINS V. SOTKA ....... 567
A. Background and Holding ........................ 567
B. Right Result, Wrong Reason ..................... 569
C. Right Result, Right Reason ...................... 572
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................... 576
The discussion that follows illustrates a sincere difference of opinion between
the author and members of the Ohio Supreme Court in regard to recent
decisions of the court. The author fldly appreciates the integrity and intellect
of the members of the court and, as reflected in other writings, often agrees
with decisions of the court which have fostered the interests of persons
deserving compensation for harm caused by defective products.
I. THE CULMINATING BATTLE - STATE EX REL. OHIO ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS
v. SHEWARD
For more than a decade a war has been waged between forces seeking
legislative reform of tort law, with emphasis on product liability, and the Ohio
Supreme Court. The battleground has been the legislative enactments of the
Ohio General Assembly. This legislation has faced consistent challenge before
the court as a proper exercise of its power of judicial review. Time and time
IProfessor of Law, Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
J.D. Comell Law School, LL.M. New York University. This article was made possible
through the generous support of the Cleveland-Marshall Fund of the Cleveland State
University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
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again the court's philosophical approach, predicated on a need to protect
injured parties and guarantee compensation for harm, has led to
determinations that given legislation fails constitutional scrutiny.
2
In a real sense, the Court has become a super legislature comprised of a
somewhat consistent four member majority.3 State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Shezvard,4 foreshadows what may be the ultimate battle. The result
of that battle could end the war. That end will be the unconditional surrender
of tort reform advocates. Absent a significant change in the composition of the
court, future efforts at tort reform which in any way impede the right of
recovery will be preordained to an early demise.
In Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers the court accepted original jurisdiction of a
complaint seeking a writ of mandamus or prohibition in regard to Amended
H.B. No. 350. H.B. 350 reflects a major effort to reform the law of product
liability. This effort not only reiterated much existing statutory and decisional
law, it also addressed significant areas of concern not previously addressed by
the General Assembly. Several of these efforts are either untested in decisional
law or inconsistent with the law prior to the enactment of the Bill.5
The dissenters argued that the court did not have the power to assume
jurisdiction over the matter and that doing so was a misapplication of the
mandamus power. Regardless of whether the majority abused judicial
authority, the ultimate issue would eventually have reached the court.
2See generally, Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform Versus The Ohio Constitution, 69
TEMPLE L. REV. 1155 (1996).
3 Each of the primary cases which are the focus of this article: Collins v. Sotka, 692
N.E.2d 581 (Ohio 1998); State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 689
N.E.2d 971 (Ohio 1998); and Carrel v. Allied Products Corp., 677 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio 1997);
was decided by the same four members of the court: Justices Douglas, Resnick, Sweeney
and Pfeifer. In Carrel these justices were joined by Justice Lundberg Stratton.
4689 N.E.2d 971 (Ohio 1998).
5 See e.g., OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (Anderson 1998) (abolishing the consumer
expectancy test for design defect and mandating that a product is not defective in design
or formulation if no practical and technically feasible alternative design or formulation
was available at the time the product left the control of its manufacturer); Cf. Cremeans
v. International Harvester Co., 452 N.E.2d 1281 (Ohio 1983); Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co.,
432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982); Temple v. Wean United Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1977);
accord, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b)(1997); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.791 (1998) (precluding a product liability claim based on
industrywide, enterprise, or alternative liability); Cf. Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp.,
653 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80 (1998) (permitting
evidence of failure to comply with a recall notice to support defenses of contributory
negligence or assumption of the risk); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20 (1998) (applying
principles of comparative negligence to product liability claims); Cf. Crislip v. Twentieth
Century Heating & Ventilating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177 (Ohio 1990); Bowling v. Heil Co.,
511 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1987).
[Vol. 45:539
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The complainant, the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, played an
instrumental role as amicus counsel in Carrel v. Allied Products Corp.6 This
complainant, a highly regarded professional organization, has unquestionably
earned the respect of the court. Its position may well be given the benefit of any
doubt. The Complaint, as described in the dissent, asserts that H.B. 350 is
unconstitutional for any one of several reasons. 7 The only serious question is
whether the court, when it reaches the merits, will void only selected sections
of the new law or whether it will void the entire Act. 8 The court majority has
made manifest its ability to negate reform efforts through constitutional
analysis and through statutory interpretation. 9 One hopes that the court, in
deciding the fate of H.B. 350, will act with restraint and give a reasonable
measure of deference to the General Assembly. If that restraint is shown, the
court could, and should, carefully scrutinize the constitutionality of some
aspects of the Act, such as the omission of punitive damages from wrongful
death action judgments.10 On the other hand, the court should uphold many
6 "However, as amicus curiae, The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers, aptly points out,
the phrase 'subject to' is not strong enough to completely eliminate unmentioned
common-law theories." Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 799.
7 Relators claim that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 is unconstitutional because, among other
things, it conflicts with rules promulgated by the court, and further violates the
one-subject rule, right to a jury trial, prohibition on damage caps for wrongful death,
right to a remedy, due process, equal protection, prohibition on special privileges, and
prohibition against retroactive laws. 689 N.E.2d at 971 (Cook, J. dissenting).
8 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994)
(striking all provisions of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 107, as enacted in violation of the one subject
rule, Ohio Constitution Section 15(D), Article II). Alternatively, the court could strike
down a substantial number of specific sections, such as those cited supra note 5, and
then rule that absent these provisions the entire Act fails as no longer meeting its
legislative objective. That some of the individual sections can be successfully challenged
is abundantly clear. See cases infra note 26.
9 The court's approach to constitutional analysis will also be applied to a broad based
constitutional attack focused on section 2745.01 of the Ohio Revised Code. See id.
§ 2745.01 (eff. Nov. 1, 1995) which redefines employment intentional tort to overrule
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982), and its
progeny. As many intentional tort actions arise from industrial machinery related
injuries, the relationship to product liability is evident. The statute was improperly
deemed in violation of the equal protection clause. Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc.,
No.1-97-32, 1997 WL 729098 (Ohio App., Nov. 18,1997), discretionary appeal allowed, 691
N.E.2d 1061 (Ohio April 1, 1998). The court has also determined to address this issue in
a certified question proceeding. Mullins v. Rio Algom, Inc., 689 N.E.2d 50 (1998). Of
interest, and perhaps a portent of decision, Justices Douglas, Resnick and Sweeney
dissented in Johnson whereas Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Resnick and Lundberg
Stratton dissented in Mullins.
lOCf. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.801 (Anderson 1998) allowing such damages in
product liability actions while establishing well conceived procedural and evidentiary
safeguards against excessive awards.
1997]
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of the Act's most innovative provisions including those addressing claimant's
own conduct. 11
The two decisions discussed below illustrate the court's power to win its war
with the General Assembly by the simple expedient of replacing legislative
words and intent with judicial interpretations of those same words through
innovation which defies logic and the rules of grammar. It has often be said
that censorship is dangerous because there is no one to censor the censors. For
advocates of tort reform, especially those who seek to recognize that injured
parties can, and often do, contribute to their own harm by failing to comply
with recall notifications or by engaging in conduct made dangerous by alcohol
or drug abuse, or by simply failing to act in a reasonable manner, the question
is: what can be done if the final arbiter of the law acts in an arbitrary manner.
II. THE ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT PRODUCT DESIGN - CARREL v. ALLIED
PRODUCTS CORPORATION
A. Background
Despite its lack of logic, the Ohio Supreme Court's holding in Carrel should
surprise no one. Determining that the Ohio Product Liability Act (hereinafter
"Act")12 does not bar a common law action for negligent design, the court held
that summary judgment should have been denied because a fact issue existed
as to whether an employee assumed the risk of harm while working on a large
transfer press. Plaintiff-Appellant, Donald Carrel, an employee of Whirlpool
Corporation, was injured while working on a press designed and
manufactured by a corporate division of Defendant-Appellee, Allied Products
Corporation.' 3 Plaintiff filed suit alleging statutory causes of action under the
Act together with a common law negligent design claim.14 The appellate court
ruled that the Act abrogated common law causes of action including the
negligent design claim. The appellate court also granted Allied Products'
11E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (B)(1) (Anderson 1998) (addressing the effect
of release in regard to decedent's prior personal injury action and effectively overruling
Thompson v. Wing, 637 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio 1994)); § 2307.80 (failure to heed a recall
notice); §§ 2315.19 and 2315.20 (effect of contributory negligence); and § 2323.59 (effect
of substance abuse as a contributing cause of injury in tort claims including product
liability claims). That the substance abuse defense is contained in a "tort" section of the
Revised Code rather than the "product liability" sections of the Revised Code may
provide the court with an opportunity to improperly conclude that H.B. violates the one
subject rule.
12 0HIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.71-.80 (Anderson 1998)(effective January 5, 1988)
(amended effective January 27, 1997). Although the wording of the relevant sections
considered by the court remain unchanged, the scope of the Amended Act may have a
significant effect on future constitutional analysis. See §§ 2307.71(M), 2307.72(A),
2307.73.
13 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 797-98.
14 1d.
[Vol. 45:539
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motion for summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiff assumed the risk of
harm as a matter of law.15 Both rulings were reversed.
This outcome reflects the continuing battle between the objective of the
General Assembly to impose limitations on the liability of tort defendants and
the policy of the courts to compensate and protect injured parties whenever
possible.16 The first part of the appellate court's holding is predicated on a
questionable rule of statutory construction, while the second applies prior law
in an extraordinary manner. Both rulings serve the underlying judicial policy
of encouraging compensation for harm and distort the law to gain an objective
of minimal value or need.
Distortions aside, the lack of surprise at the court's major holding - the
continued existence of a common law negligent design claim - is grounded in
prior rulings which fall into two categories. The first category reflects the
court's willingness to hold all, or parts of, tort reform legislation
unconstitutional. The second category limits or expands prior decisional law
to support both a cause of action and a likelihood of success for injured parties.
While the General Assembly's tort reform efforts were excessive in some areas,
the court fails to recognize that the overall legislative effort represents a rational
and limited means to delineate a body of law which protects both alleged
tortfeasors, particularly product liability defendants, and injured parties. A fair
balance between the rights of manufacturers and injured consumers requires
correlative rights and duties. This essential concept was not fully appreciated
by either the General Assembly or the court.
In Carrel, the court apparently misconceives the concept that product related
injuries arise from the confluence of three factors: the product, the
environment in which that product is used, and the conduct of the party using
the product. An injured party's liability may be greater than that of a manu-
151d. at 798. Further detail as to the facts surrounding the assumption of the risk ruling
are set forth infra, at note 115.
16 Although this article is critical of some decisions, the court generally has done a
remarkable job in its effort to strike a proper balance between the needs of injured
consumers and product manufacturers. See, e.g., Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 653
N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1995)(alternative liability and rejection of broad based industry wide
liability); Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 575 N.E.2d 416 (Ohio 1991)(punitive
damages); Freas v. Prater Constr. Co., 573 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 1991)(adequacy of warning);
R.H. Macy &.Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., (intervening cause); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic
Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987)(successor corporate liability); Anderson v.
Ceccardi, 451 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 1983)(merger of contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk for purposes of comparative negligence); Wilfong v. Batdorf, 451
N.E.2d 1185 (Ohio 1983)(recognition of common law comparative negligence), overruled
in part by Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988); Knitz v. Minster
Mach. Co., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1982)(abandoning the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement of strict liability and adopting risk-benefit analysis); Leicthamer v.
American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981)(second collision liability theory);
Temple v. Wean United Inc., 432 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio 1977)(adopting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965)).
1997]
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facturer's as recognized in the law of comparative fault. 17 Assumption of the
risk, a form of user conduct, 18 should always be an element in the liability
calculus. Although Carrel theoretically allows for such conduct to be a factor,
in reality the decision will negate the assumption of the risk defense in
work-related cases. 19 The court has made it clear that employees need pay little
attention to their own conduct as they will be faced with gossamer, if any, legal
liability for their actions.
The court continues, perhaps inadvertently, to encourage the trend toward
societal rather than individual responsibility. Many products, no matter how
well-designed, carry an inherent danger. However, the user must bear
responsibility for the ensuing harm when that user voluntarily encounters such
a danger and fails to take available and known steps to minimize that danger.
Both the General Assembly's effort to fully negate manufacturer liability where
there has been an assumption of risk, and the court's effort to maximize liability
in the same circumstance, miss the mark. An approach is needed which applies
comparative fault principles to all product liability actions and their conduct
based defenses. 20
On the constitutional plane, a majority of the court has shown a willingness,
if not an outright desire, to vitiate tort reform efforts through any possible
methodology. In some instances this result has been proper; for example, the
court found Ohio Revised Code section 4120.80 an invalid attempt to overturn
the court's doctrine of intentional tort as an exception to workers'
compensation immunity.21 The legislation under consideration not only
17Comparative fault is distinct from the narrower principle of comparative
negligence set forth in section 2315.19 of the Ohio Revised Code.
18 This was recognized by the court's merger of contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk for purposes of comparative negligence. See Anderson, 451 N.E.2d
at 780.
19 The court's reversal of the grant of summary judgment was predicated, in part, on
the determination that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the presence of
assumption of the risk. See infra Part II(E).
20 This approach would foster one of the recognized policies which led to adoption
of strict liability in tort: a manufacturer who profits from the sale of goods should bear
the loss for harm caused by that product. Neither this, nor any other policy supporting
strict liability, imposes insurer status upon product manufacturers. See, e.g., Delk v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 545 F.Supp. 969,972 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (relying on Strimbu v. American
Chain & Cable Co., 516 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1975)). Seealso Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods.
Inc., 472 N.E.2d 707 (Ohio 1984)(manufacturer does not guarantee that its product is
incapable of causing injury). Imposing liability upon a manufacturer for the degree of
contribution to the harm caused by its defective product will reduce profits and force
the manufacturer to bear an appropriate share of the cost of harm.
21Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991). The effect of Brady was
to restore the full common law intentional tort doctrine with its substantial certainty test
as enunciated in Jones v. VIP Dev. Corp., 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984), which expanded
upon the seminal decision, of Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., Inc., 433
N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982).
[Vol. 45:539
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redefined "intentional tort," it also removed key fact determinations from the
jury and placed them in the hands of the trial court and the Industrial
Commission. The General Assembly made it easy for the court to void the
attempted reincarnation of its statutory changes (Amended House Bill No.,
107, effective October 20, 1993) as that effort violated the one-subject rule of the
Ohio Constitution. 22
In other areas, the court's constitutional analysis was openly imaginative
and a reflection of an outcome-determinative approach. Although the court's
resolution in Carrel obviated the need to address constitutional issues raised by
plaintiff,23 these issues may be ripe for future consideration. 24
The Act is one element in a series of tort reform enactments designed to either
create uniformity and fairness in Ohio tort law (from the perspective of
industry) or to impose draconian limitations on rightful recovery for personal
injury claimants (from the perspective of the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers).
Regardless of one's perception of the motivating factor, the Act represents one
step in a long-term legislative effort to reform Ohio tort law. The court's
constitutional treatment of past reform efforts has direct bearing on the likely
outcome of the constitutional challenges posed, but not decided, in Carrel.
Recent precedent suggests that, despite the strong presumption of legislative
validity,25 the court is quite willing to hold tort reform legislation violative of
one or more provisions of the Ohio Constitution.26
22 See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 631 N.E.2d 582 (Ohio 1994). The
General Assembly enacted yet another effort to overcome the intentional tort doctrine.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01 (Anderson 1998) (effective November 1, 1995). This
more limited effort, which redefines intentional tort as an act in which the employer
"deliberately and intentionally" injures an employee, does not raise a legitimate
constitutional issue. The decisions in Johnson and Mullins, may void this legislation and
restore the ill-advised substantial certainty test. See supra note 9.
23 Constitutional issues were addressed at the appellate level and in the briefs to the
Supreme Court of Ohio. SeeCarrel v. Allied Products Corp., No. 9-94-24,1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3091 (Ohio App. July 11, 1995); Plaintiff-Appellant's Memorandum in Support
of Jurisdiction at 7-10 (No. 95-1773); Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 24-31, Carrel (No.
95-1773); and Amicus Curiae Brief of the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers at 4-6, Carrel
(No. 95-1773). These briefs, together with those filed on behalf of Allied Products
Corporation, were kindly provided by plaintiff's lead counsel, Richard Alkire.
24 This assumes that the General Assembly will amend the Act to add language
expressly stating that it is intended to abrogate all common law causes of action not
incorporated into its provisions. Absent a significant change in the membership of the
General Assembly, such an effort is likely.
Consistent with the principle that a court must not decide constitutional issues if
a matter can be resolved on other substantive grounds, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993), the court did not discuss the constitutional issues posed in the
briefs. If the General Assembly amends the Product Liability Act to overrule Carrel, the
court will be forced to consider a wide gamut of constitutional assertions.
25 Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 508 (Ohio 1994). "All legislative enactments
enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality." Id. State v. Dorso, 446 N.E.2d 449,450
(Ohio 1983). "Courts must apply all presumptions and pertinent rules of construction
so as to uphold, if at all possible (such statutes)." Id. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher,
1997]
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B. A Brief Foray: The Constitutional Issues
Case law lends some credence to assertions that the statutory abolition of a
claim for recovery based on negligent design violates the Ohio Constitution.
Although appealing on the surface, these agruments should be rejected.
The core arguments against the statutory exclusion of a common law
negligent design action are predicated on claims that abolition of this cause of
action (1) deprives claimants of a vested right to seek redress in violation of the
Ohio Constitution Article I, section 16 (open courts or right to remedy), and (2)
violates both the due process mandate of Article I, section 16 and the equal
protection clause of Article I, section 2.27 To succeed, these arguments must
establish that there is a fundamental right to a claim for negligent design under
a strict scrutiny analysis. Moreover, it is essential to find that the courthouse
door has been closed to those seeking recovery for harm caused by defective
products. The door is open. Indeed, the Act codifies law that eased the burden
upon product liability claimants through its adoption of no-fault strict liability
principles. 28
128 N.E.2d 59, 60 (Ohio 1955). "An enactment by the General Assembly is presumed to
be constitutional." Id. See also Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991);
Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986).
26See, e.g., Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1994)(allowing the
court to set the amount of punitive damages in tort actions, section 2315.21(C)(2) of the
Ohio Revised Code, violated the right to trial by jury); Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639
N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994)(statute of repose limiting rights to proceed against designers
and architects of improvements to real property, section 2305.131 of the Ohio Revised
Code, violated the open courts provision); Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio
1994)(abrogation of the collateral source rule, section 2307.45 of the Ohio Revised Code,
violated the right to trial by jury, due process, equal protection, and the open courts
provision); Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1993) (accrual date for DES
related injury, section 2305.10 of the Ohio Revised Code, violated open courts
provision); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991)(cap on general damages for
medical malpractice claims in section 2307.43 of the Ohio Revised Code violated due
process); Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991)(statutory changes in
the law of intentional tort as an exception to workers' compensation immunity, section
4121.80 of the Ohio Revised Code, violated equal protection and the right to trial by jury;
concurring justices also noted a violation of the open courts provision); Gaines v.
Pre-Term Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987)(medical malpractice statute,
section 2305.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, violated open courts provision).
27 A claim that abolition violates the privileges and immunity clause of Article I,
Section 2, has also been raised. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 30, Carrel (No. 95-1773).
This argument is no stronger or weaker than that of the broader equal protection
argument. The right to trial by jury, OHIO CONST. art. I, § 5, is not implicated as where
the General Assembly has the authority to abrogate a cause of action the absence of a
right to trial on such a claim is foreclosed.
28 0HIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75 (Anderson 1998). The appellate decision asserts
that the Act does not foreclose a remedy and creates two previously unavailable causes
of action: post-market failure to warn liability and misrepresentation liability. Carrel,
1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3091, at *22, relying on OHIO REV. CODE §§ 2307.76-.77 (Anderson
1994).
[Vol. 45:539
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Neither the open courts provision nor any other constitutional mandate
dictates that there is a vested right to common law actions. The furthest the
Court has gone in this regard is to recognize that the abolition of a common
law cause of action must comport with constitutional demands.
No one has a vested right in rules of common law. Rights of property
vested under the common law cannot be taken away without due
process, but the law itself as a rule of conduct may be changed at the
will of the legislature unless prevented by constitutional limitations. The
great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they
are developed and to adapt it to new circumstances.
29
Hardy v. VerMeulen recognized Ohio's right to remedy provision and mandated
court access for those seeking redress for personal injury. Therefore, the court
deemed the medical malpractice statute of repose unconstitutional because it
closed the door to a remedy before a cause of action could accrue. 30 No similar
slamming of the door can be found in the Product Liability Act.
Legislation which involves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class
is valid provided it comports with the rational basis test.31 Perhaps most
germane to the proper analysis of Carrel is the standard applicable to the right
to remedy provision. If this right is violated, strict scrutiny becomes imperative
since a fundamental right would be involved. In Carrel, plaintiff's counsel made
precisely this argument, relying in part on Fabrey v. McDonald Police
Department.32
Fabrey did not support a strict scrutiny analysis, 33 although it recognized that
analysis of the right to remedy provision focused on whether a cause of action
existed at the time the constitutional provision came into being.34 The Fabrey
court merely held that the General Assembly had the right to define the
"contours of the state's liability, within the constraints of equal protection and
29 Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626,630 (Ohio 1987) (citations omitted). See Strock
v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1241 (Ohio 1988).
30Hardy, 512 N.E.2d at 627-29. This author has consistently agreed with the court on
this and several other points. See Stephen J. Werber, A National Product Liability Statute
of Repose - Let's Not, 64 TENN. L. REV. 763 (1997); Ohio Tort Reform Versus the Ohio
Constitution, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1155 (1996); The Constitutional Dimension of a National
Products Liability Statute of Repose, 40 VILL. L. REV. 985 (1995).
31Fabrey v. McDonald Village Police Dep't, 639 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ohio 1994)(equal
protection). The equivalent standard, in regard to due process concerns, is whether the
legislation bears "a real and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals or
general welfare of the public and if it is not unreasonable or arbitrary." Id. at 34.
32 See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 26, Carrel (No. 95-1773). Fabrey, 639 N.E.2d at 33.
33 The Court of Appeals in Carrel applied a rational basis standard of scrutiny to reject
the contention that abolition of the common law negligent design theory violated the
equal protection and due process clauses. Carrel, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3091, at *22-27.
34 Fabrey, 639 N.E.2d at 35.
19971
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due process, [and] the right to sue the state [was] not fundamental."35 The
Fabrey decision also recognized that prior case law invalidating legislation
under the right to remedy provision involved "the serious infringement of a
clearly preexisting right to bring suit.' 36
Neither the abolition of a common law cause of action for negligent design,
nor the availability of an assumption of the risk defense to employment related
product liability injury, works such a "serious infringement." Parties injured by
defective products retain full access to the courts and full capacity to recover
for harm caused by defective products. The fact that a cause of action for
negligent design existed at any specific time is, therefore, irrelevant to the
discussion and cannot be utilized to bootstrap a rational basis claim into a strict
scrutiny analysis.
The sole purpose for retaining a negligent design cause of action has no
bearing upon an injured party's capacity to seek relief. The Act amply provides
such a remedy in a manner far more favorable to the claimant than a negligence
action. By continuing this cause of action, the court imposed a "serious
infringement" upon the rights of products liability defendants. These
defendants have lost an otherwise complete defense - assumption of the risk -
to principles of comparative negligence.
Assuming the Product Liability Act is amended to overrule Carrel, or upon
reconsideration the court reverses field,37 the abolition of a common law action
for negligent design should pass constitutional muster. The court would be
compelled to validate legislation clearly abrogating this cause of action despite
its reluctance to accept tort reform as a proper legislative function.
Under a truly rational approach, one must conclude that abolition of the
common law negligent design cause of action:
1. Has no effect on an injured party's ability to seek
compensation for harm caused by a defective product;
2. Does not discriminate against members of a suspect class;
3. Does not impose a serious infringement on a fundamental
right - even assuming that such a right exists; and
3 5 Id.
36 1d. Relying on decisions invalidating repose provisions, Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
609 N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1993); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987); and State
ex rel. Christian v. Barry, 175 N.E. 855 (Ohio 1931) (invalidating a police department rule
which made a remedy contingent on permission of an officer's superior).
37Such a reversal is possible. See Wilfong v. Batdorf, 451 N.E.2d 1185 (Ohio 1983)
(overruling two comparative negligence decisions, Straub v. Voss, 438 N.E.2d 888 (Ohio
1982), and Viers v. Dunlap, 438 N.E.2d 881 (Ohio 1982)), overruled in part by, Van Fossen
v. Babcock & Wilcox, 522 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 1988). See also Roberts v. Ohio Permanente
Medical Group, Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 483 (1996) (redefining essential causation elements
to permit a "loss of chance" action to proceed), overruling Cooper v. Sisters of Charity,
272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971).
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4. Advances the legislative intent to bring greater fairness into
tort law, including products liability law, and is rationally
related to that important governmental interest.
38
These four factors compel the conclusion that abrogation of the common law
negligent design cause of action is constitutional. The Carrel court should have
found that the Act abolished this cause of action, and the abolition was a proper
exercise of legislative power. The court should have also determined that the
lower courts properly granted summary judgment based on assumption of the
risk, as no genuine issue of material fact existed.
C. The Holdings
The Ohio Supreme Court's analysis of legislative intent reflects an unstated
objective validating the cliche of the "tail wagging the dog". The objective was
to negate, if not demolish, assumption of the risk as a defense in products
liability claims arising from workplace injury. With this understanding of the
court's unstated objective, it becomes much easier to comprehend the court's
selection of governing law and its semantic games. This means-to-an-end
permitted the court to conclude that the Act did not abrogate the common law
negligent design cause of action. Unlike the supreme court, the court of appeals
addressed this most significant question in a straightforward and logical
manner.
1. In the Ohio Court of Appeals
After a brief survey of the claims which an injured party could bring to seek
relief for product-related injury before and after adoption of the Act, the court
of appeals rejected the plaintiff's contention that the Act did not abrogate a
common law negligent design theory. The court recognized that the General
Assembly was well aware of where it wanted to retain a negligence theory and
where it chose not to perpetuate a negligence theory. Though the court did not
rely on the well-recognized principle of interpretation known as expressio unius
est exclusio alterius,39 this principle accurately summarizes the appellate court's
approach.
In section 2307.72(D)(1), the Act preserves all common and civil law penalties
arising from "contamination or pollution of the environment;" thus, the
"legislature did not intend to supersede nonstatutory forms of relief in
environmental actions."40 Section 2307.78(A)(1) provides that a negligence
claim may be brought against a supplier. This provision, designed to hold a
supplier liable for its own misconduct rather than that of a product
manufacturer, protects the consumer by permitting a cause of action in strict
38 This result is reached even if we accept the position that there is no litigation crisis
and no insurance crisis.
39 See e.g., Craftsman Type, Inc. v. Lindley, 451 N.E.2d 768, 770 (Ohio 1983); State ex
rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 224 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ohio 1967).
40 Carrel, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3091, at *19.
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liability where an action against the manufacturer is not available or where the
supplier has assumed the role of manufacturer.
41
The significant "silence" of the legislature as to a negligent design claim in a
product liability action against a manufacturer, in light of its recognition of
negligence principles in specific situations, led the appellate court to conclude
that such an action no longer exists. Therefore, to "maintain a products liability
suit against a manufacturer, one must conform his cause of action to the
statute."4 2 The more obvious reason for concluding that the Act provides the
exclusive means for recovery, the "subject to" language of section 2307.73 was
not needed to support the appellate decision.
43
2. In the Ohio Supreme Court
Rather than give the General Assembly credit for knowing its intentions and
its knowledge of negligence concepts, the Supreme Court, in a true act of
legerdemain, managed to distort rules of statutory construction, to misstate its
own syllabus in McAuliffe v. Western States Import Company,44 and to redefine
the reasoning of McAuliffe to support its determination that the common law
of negligent design defect remains viable.
To the extent it stressed the need to seek out the legislative intent, the court's
approach to the effect of the Act was eminently correct. Precedent did require
a clear expression of intent before a statute could be construed as abolishing a
previously existing common law cause of action. The Carrel court started with
the holding and reasoning in State ex rel. Morris v. Sullivan.45 Morris supported
the conclusion that there can be no abrogation of common law rights unless
the statute contains express language to that effect.
4 1 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.78(A) (Anderson 1998).
42 Carrel, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3091, at *20.
43 The appellate court relied upon section 2307.72 of the Ohio Revised Code as the
provision delineating the laws which were not superseded, but made no direct use of
the "subject to" language of section 2307.72(A).
44Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 800 (citing McAuliffe v. Western States Import Co., 651 N.E.2d
957 (1995)). The court properly ignored plaintiff's assertion that two appellate court
decisions recognized the continued viability of this theory. See Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellants, Carrel at 21 (No. 95-1773) (citing Falls v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., No.
95APE06-757, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5645 (Ohio App. Dec. 21, 1995) and Mullins v.
Clark Equip. Co., No. 14426, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 4832 (Ohio App. Oct. 26, 1994)).
Though both cases involved products liability claims against manufacturers including
a claim based on negligent design, neither addressed the validity of this claim.
Resolution of a case on a specific issue, without addressing the validity of an alleged
cause of action, provides no basis for interpreting the decision as a sub silentio approval
of an alleged cause of action. But see Sikorski v. Link Elec. & Safety Control Co., No.
70187, 1997 WL 15274, at *6 (Ohio App. Jan. 16, 1997); Long v. Tokai Bank, 682 N.E.2d
1052, 1056 (Ohio App. 1996); Brown v. McDonald's Corp., 655 N.E.2d 440, 441 (Ohio
App. 1995).
45 State ex rel. Morris v. Sullivan, 90 N.E. 146 (Ohio 1909).
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The Morris syllabus is not this restrictive: "the Legislature will not be
presumed or held to have intended a repeal of the settled rules of the common
law, unless the language employed by it clearly expresses or imports such
intention.' 46 Unless the Morris court included the words "or imports" as a
redundancy, these words must have additional significance. Thus, precise
words of abrogation need not be present if the thrust of the Act and the
legislative intent creates that effect. Morris does not require the General
Assembly to include a prefatory statement, nor the following language within
given sections: "This Act is intended to abrogate all common law causes of
action for products liability claims not enumerated herein."
47
The Ohio Supreme Court also relies on two appellate court decisions to
support its assertion that specific words are necessary to find an abrogation of
the common law.48 Both of these decisions unsuccessfully sought express
words of intent, and both refused to extend a statute beyond its terms. In Iron
City Produce Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., the court recognized that judicial
interpretation was an improper device to extend the application of a statute.
4 9
The Iron City court refused to include express companies within the venue
provisions of legislation where the legislation designated a number of similar
companies. Quite simply, since the legislation controlled judicial authority over
a listed group of entities, it could not be extended to include any other entity.
This reasoning supports the expressio unius principle and strongly parallels the
action of the appellate court in Carrel. The supreme court, however, replaced
section 2307.78 of the Act with its own section and modified section
2307.73(A)(1) to accommodate this previously omitted cause of action. Did
someone say that courts do not legislate?
50
Based on an approach demanding express words of abrogation, the court
found that sections 2307.71(M), 2307.73, and even 2307.72(A), failed to include
express wording which declared that the common law action of negligent
design had been abrogated. Of course, this is correct. This does not mean,
46 1d. at syllabus 3 (emphasis added).
47 The General Assembly could have placed such language in the Act. Somewhat
similar language is found in some laws, including the Criminal Code. The absence of
given language, where other language serves the same purpose, is not revealing. The
analysis must focus on what was stated rather than what was not stated. The court
wisely refrained from a line of argument predicated on more specific statutory language
in other fields.
48 Frantz v. Maher, 155 N.E.2d 471 (Ohio App. 1957); Iron City Produce Co. v.
American Ry. Express Co., 153 N.E. 316 (Ohio 1926). The principle of law utilized in
Frantz was proper, but could have been applied differently in Carrel. The Frantz decision
held that a statute of frauds governing agreements to make a will or devise did not
extend to a promise to die intestate.
49 1ron City, 153 N.E. 316.
50Compare Justice Cardozo's well known advice in the field of contract law: "We
are not at liberty to revise while professing to construe." Sun Printing & Publ'g. Ass'n.
v. Remington Paper and Power Co., 139 N.E. 470, 471 (N.Y. 1923).
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however, that the legislature adopted a major piece of products liability
legislation without the intent to have it represent a comprehensive law
establishing all legal theories under which a products liability claim may be
brought.
The three decisions relied upon in Carrel could have yielded a result opposite
to the court's decision. Both of the appellate decisions gave effect to the plain
meaning of the relevant legislation, though both utilized the principle that
clarity is required before a legislative act will be deemed to abrogate a common
law action. Each refused to extend the effect of the legislation beyond that
meaning.
The Morris decision was predicated on an ambiguity in the legislation. The
question presented in that case was whether an outgoing governor had the
power to appoint a commissioner where this would contravene an established
common law doctrine that an officer could not make a valid appointment for
a term which is not to begin until after expiration of the term of office of the
appointing officer. This question was arguably answered by the fact that the
legislation in question mandated only that appointments be made in January.S1
One week prior to the expiration of his term of office, on January 4th, the
governor made an appointment.52 The court held that the inclusion of the
month of January in the legislation was insufficient to abrogate the common
law.53
In Morris, the most relevant case relied upon in Carrel, the court faced a
blatant effort to continue executive authority after the executive was not in
office when there was "no present necessity . . . for the making of such
appointment. ' 54 The common law and the statutory language could be read in
pari materia, as they were not inconsistent. In effect, the common law
complemented and clarified the legislation. At most, the court stretched to find
the word "January" was insufficient to suggest the necessary legislative intent
in a case where no other evidence of specific intent could be found.5
5
The court observed that the statute, "neither in express terms, nor by necessary
implication from the language therein employed"5 6 imposes the duty to appoint
on the outgoing governor. This reasoning, which clarified the syllabus,
establishes that the common law can be abrogated by either (1) express
language, or (2) wording which imports - by necessary implication - the intent




55 Cf. Muczyk v. Cleveland State Univ., 675 N.E.2d 1283 (Ohio App. 1996) (the term
"calendar year," as used in section 3307.35 of the Ohio Revised Code, defined to mean
a period of twelve consecutive months).
56 Morris, 90 N.E. at 150 (emphasis added).
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to abrogate the common law. The Carrel decision failed to recognize the
existence of the second methodology.
Rather, the Carrel court asserted that there was no explicit statement in
section 2307.71(M) of the Ohio Revised Code which abrogated the common
law cause of action. This section provides, in applicable part, that a products
liability claim means:
A claim that is asserted in a civil action and that seeks to recover
compensatory damages from a manufacturer ... for death, physical
injury to person, emotional distress, or physical damage to property
other than the product in question that arose from any of the following
[design, formulation, production, construction creation, assembly,
rebuilding, testing, or marketing of the product; warning or instruction
defects; or failure to conform to any relevant representations or
warranty].
57
There is no explicit statement that this definition excludes other forms of
common law actions for product defect litigation. Yet, it is hard to conceive of
a broader definition that could better announce a legislative intent of
exclusivity. The plain meaning standard of statutory interpretation, fully
consistent with the reasoning and outcome of each of the cases relied upon in
Carrel, supports the conclusion that the definition encompasses "design"
claims. The section does not differentiate between types of design claims. The
legislative intent is clear:
The definition is intended to be broad and to embrace claims
challenging virtually any aspect of commercial product design,
manufacture, marketing, or warning. The definition does not
distinguish one legal theory of recovery (e.g., negligence or strict
liability) from another. Whether a civil action includes a "product
liability claim" depends on what is sought and from whom it is
sought.
58
The cause of action in Carrel was (1) a civil action, (2) seeking compensatory
damages from a manufacturer, (3) for physical injury, (4) arising from a design
defect. The Act was designed to address all such claims. The plain rule and
legislative intent expressed by draftsman of the' bill mandate the same
conclusion: the definition is comprehensive and all-inclusive, and excludes all
forms of action not specified within its terms.
5 7 0HIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(M) (Anderson 1998).
5 8 STANTON G. DARLING II, OHIO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACt 46 (Banks-Baldwin 1987).
Professor Darling was an advisor to the Office of the Speaker of the House and draftsman
of a majority of the Act. This author testified before the relevant committee of the General
Assembly and, at the request of the chairman, forwarded various comments and
proposed language modifying initial drafts of the Act. Several of these proposals were
incorporated into the legislation.
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The Carrel court's treatment of the definition section of the Act avoids any
close analysis in favor of a simplistic "it is not explicitly" palliative. This
approach was not applicable to the argument that an explicit statement of
intent negated any claim to the continued existence of common law actions.
Section 2307.72(A) mandates that: "Any recovery of compensatory damages
based on a product liability claim is subject to sections 2307.71 to 2307.79 of the
Revised Code." The nine referenced sections of the Code comprise the Product
Liability Act and carefully delineate each available theory of action. Although
negligence actions are specifically carried forward in section 2307.72(D)(2)(b)
and section 2307.78, there is no mention of a common law action for negligent
design. Rather, design claims are specifically governed by the strict liability
provisions of section 2307.75.
A basic rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and apply the plain
meaning of the words chosen by the legislative body.59 Accepting the claim of
the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers as amicus curiae, the Carrel court determined
that the phrase "'subject to' is not strong enough to completely eliminate
unmentioned common-law theories."60 The court then found that, under a
principle of strict construction, the statute could not be extended by implication
and, therefore, the common law action for negligent design was not abrogated.
Even without trying to ascertain the meaning of "not strong enough to
completely eliminate," the court's conclusion is mind boggling.
6 1
There was no need for the court's approach. "Subject to" is strong enough,
clear enough, and loud enough for any who want to listen. The legal definition
of the term is so obvious that it can be found in a typical legal dictionary to
include the meaning "governed or affected by."62 An action "governed by"
59Section 1.42 of the Ohio Revised Code states, in applicable part: "Words and
phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and
common usage." See also O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888,895 (6th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F.Supp. 1021, 1034 (N.D. Ohio 1981); State ex
rel. Luckey v. Etheridge, 583 N.E.2d 960, 961-62 (Ohio 1991); Dixon v. Bernstein, No.
CA94-08-167, 1995 WL 448015 (July 31, 1995); John Ken Alzheimer's Ctr. v. Ohio
Certificate of Need Bd., 583 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio App. 1991).
In State v. Wilson, 673 N.E.2d 1347 (Ohio 1997), the court recognized that "the
General Assembly is not presumed to do a vain or useless thing, and that when language
is inserted in a statute it is inserted to accomplish some definite purpose." Id. at 1349
(quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Euclid, 159 N.E.2d 756, 759
(1959)). In Carrel, of course, the General Assembly's insertion of the phrase "subject to"
proved to be a "vain and useless thing."
60 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 799.
61 Id. This author cannot comprehend the meaning of the sentence. Is the court saying
that some of the theories were not abrogated? If so, what could they be? Is the court
saying that only some part of common law negligent design theory was abrogated? That
intent makes no sense.
62 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (6th ed. 1990).
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something can be subject to nothing else. 63 There was no need to seek further
elucidation of legislative intent. It was right there.
Stanton G. Darling, a draftsman of the Act, again provides the requisite
insight into the significance of this provision. His text makes clear that the
intent to be comprehensive and to omit all other actions was incorporated into
the simple phrase "subject to." He observed that under prior law "a product
liability action .. .might be tried on any one or more of ten legal theories,
including two different forms of strict liability in tort, five different warranty
theories, negligence, and negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation. "64 He then
makes the point clearly and concisely: "The provisions of R.C. 2307.71 to R.C.
2307.80, with one important exception . . . thus control the award of
compensatory and punitive damages with respect to any 'product liability
claim.' As to such a claim, those provisions control despite any inconsistent prior
Ohio common lay. "65 This is the legislative intent and the point where the court's
discussion should have both commenced and terminated. When viewed as a
whole, with recognition of the interrelationship between sections 2307.71(M)
and 2307.72(A), the plain meaning of the Act negates any necessity to apply
other principles of statutory interpretation, even those which could be forced
to yield a different result.
A reasonable reading of the express words of the Act makes it unnecessary
to determine whether the lower courts in Carrel correctly held that the Act
provided new causes of action so as to come within the ambit of a new statutory
cause of action rather than a codification of some existing law. Such a reading
also obviates the need to determine whether the inclusion of some negligence
causes of action, without mention of other negligence based theories, requires
a determination that negligent design claims were intentionally omitted and
63 Decisions such as Koske v. Townsend Eng'g, Co., 512 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. 1990), relied
upon in Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 20, are consistent with this analysis. The court held
that the Indiana Act did not affect the availability of the "open and obvious danger"
common law defense to negligence based products liability claims despite the statement
in Section 33-1-1.5-1 of the Indiana Code that the chapter "shall govern all products
liability actions, including those in which the theory of liability is negligence or strict
liability in tort." However, Section 33-1-1.5-3 of the Indiana Code provides that "[t]he
common law of this state with respect to strict liability in tort is codified and restated as
follows .... Id. The court reasoned that this was limiting language revealing an intent
to codify and preempt the common law as to only strict liability actions. The court's
interpretation of the statute was predicated on standards similar to those asserted in
this article and was affirmed by the legislature through a subsequent amendment of the
Act. See Koske, 551 N.E.2d at 442, n.2.
64 Darling, supra note 58, at 50.
651d. (emphasis added). The exception is the special provision for environmental
torts. This reasoning was applied by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals when it rejected
market share liability under Ohio law. See Kurczi v. Eli Lilly Co., 113 F.2d 1426, 1434
(6th Cir. 1997). The Court based its decision, in part, on the conclusion that the Products
Liability Act "is by its express terms exclusive." Id.
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thus abrogated.66 Recognizing an explicit statement of intent to abrogate, the
court's own standard, suffices. Only the desire to circumvent the totality of an
assumption of the risk defense explains the semantics and rationale of the Carrel
decision.
67
The majority's utilization of an improper standard for determining
legislative intent is manifest in Justice Cook's dissent. Justice Cook's opinion
establishes that reliance upon Morris is improper because it did not involve
codification of actions previously known to the common law.68 This improper
reliance led the majority to conclude that the "subject to" language of the Act
was insufficient.
The proper precedent for consideration is found in Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.,
69
a case addressing codification of the law governing living trusts. 70 Justice Cook
relied on a portion of the Bolles Syllabus that states: "[wihere the General
Assembly has codified the law on a subject, such statutory provisions are to
govern to the exclusion of the prior non-statutory law unless there is a clear
legislative intention expressed or necessarily implied that the statutory provi-
66 Application of proper principles of statutory interpretation also negate any need
for "strict construction," an approach briefly relied upon by the majority. Carrel, 677
N.E.2d at 799. This approach was utilized in-cases such as Sabol v. Pekoc, 76 N.E.2d 84
(Ohio 1947).
67 The court is right in one respect. Section 2315.20 of the Ohio Revised Code retains
assumption of the risk as a complete defense to product liability claims. Assumption of
the risk should be part of a comparative analysis in negligence actions and product
liability actions. Regrettably, the court failed to seize the opportunities presented to
achieve this goal when deciding cases such as Anderson, 451 N.E.2d 780, and Wilfong,
451 N.E.2d 1115, overruled in part by Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 522 N.E.2d
489 (Ohio 1988). To accomplish this goal would now require the court to find, as it
should, that section 2315.20 of the Ohio Revised Code violates the equal protection
clause. The court, despite its willingness to overturn tort legislation, does not appear
ready to take this step and combine it with adoption of a common law comparative fault
standard. This judicial response was improperly rejected by the Court of Appeals in
Carrel which found the different effects of assumption in tort actions as distinct from
product liability actions was consistent with equal protection. Carrel, 1995 Ohio App.
LEXIS 3091, at *26-27. On the other hand, corrective action by the General Assembly
could, and should, be taken to assure a fair balance between product defects and user
conduct or knowledge.
68 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 802 (Cook, J. dissenting in part, concurring in part).
69 Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 58 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio 1944), overruled on other grounds by,
Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 179 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1961). To assert that this decision is
inapplicable because the Act does not expressly mention or deal with negligence claims,
is to have the conclusion precede the premise. The question is whether the Act includes
such claims. Unlike Morris, the legal question posed in Bolles is virtually identical to that
posed in Carrel.
70 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.01 (Anderson 1998) (corresponds to as suggested in
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 22, General Code §§ 8617, 10504-4, and 10504-47 and
related sections).
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sions are merely cumulative."7 1 The Bolles court declared that in such cases "it
is the statutory provisions which are to be followed and it is the legislative
policy which is to be observed."72 The Carrel decision observes neither of these
principles.
The majority effectively turned the burden of proof around. Rather than an
express declaration of abrogation, precedent requires a seeking of an express
declaration of continuation. The focus of the search for legislative intent should
have been to determine whether the Act "expressed or necessarily implied that
it is merely cumulative to the common-law cause of action."73 Nothing in the
Act expressly or implicitly suggests a desire to retain any common law actions,
nor does it reflect a mere cumulation of common law actions.74 Applying the
majority's correct determination that the only evidence of intent is the "subject
to" language, it is apparent that this amply supports the conclusions of the
lower courts.
The legislature intended to abrogate all actions other than those expressed
in, and governed by, the Act. The majority opinion fails to follow the statutory
provisions and ignores legislative policy. It, therefore, fails to meet the demands
of the most pertinent precedent through ostrich-like behavior. Under any
method of statutory interpretation relying on Morris, Bolles, or McAuliffe, the
result should have been the same: a common law action for negligent design
no longer exists.
D. Misuse of McAuliffe
In an effort to lend credence to its strained analysis, the court relied
extensively on McAuliffe where, purportedly, the majority "implicitly
recognized that the Product Liability Act did not supplant the common law
71Carrel, 677 N.E. 2d at 802 (quoting Bolles, 58 N.E.2d at 384) (Cook, J. dissenting in
part, concurring in part).
72Bolles, 58 N.E.2d at 392.
73Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 802.
74 Justice Cook points out that just the opposite is true in light of the provisions in
section 2307.73(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code (limiting manufacturer liability to the
actions set forth in sections 2307.74-2307.77); the exclusion of environmental claims
found in section 2307.72(D)(1); and the retention of negligence liability for actions
against suppliers in section 2307.78. Thus, "the absence of negligent design from R.C.
2307.75 is revealing." Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 803.
This analysis is consistent with principles of comparative negligence. Contrary to
plaintiff's assertion that section 2315.19 of the Ohio Revised Code recognizes that
product liability negligence claims "continue to exist," this statute has no such effect. See
Plaintiff-Appellant's Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction at 7 and Brief at 18-19.
The statute applies to existing causes of action within its ambit. Its application to
negligent design claims is a function of the existence of such a law independent of the
comparative negligence statute. Once a cause of action is abrogated, it cannot be
resurrected by application of section 2315.19 as the section has nothing to which it can
be applied.
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applicable to products liability claims." 75 Not only was there no such
implication, McAuliffe suggested the opposite conclusion. The majority
analysis in McAuliffe began by taking out of context an essential principle found
in its syllabus. The majority opinion in Carrel asserted that the McAuliffe
syllabus states "the Act 'does not provide a cause of action that would not exist
but for the statute. ' "76 The syllabus actually states: "Because R.C. 2307.73 does
not provide a cause of action that would not exist but for the statute.. ... 77 The
distinction between a syllabus holding which references a section of a statute
and a syllabus holding which references a complete Act is ignored. With this
change in the law, the majority constructed the McAtdffe road to reach a
decision inconsistent with its original blueprint.
Next, the Carrel majority correctly observed that the McAuiffe decision
applied a "but for" test to determine that the Act did not create a previously
unavailable cause of action and did not represent an action upon liability
created by statute.78 The holding in McAuliffe was directed solely to the
question of whether the Act codified prior law so as to come within the personal
injury statute of limitations or created a statutory cause of action subject to a
longer statute of limitations. 79 It was silent as to whether application of the "but
for" test also meant all common law product liability theories survived
enactment of the Act. Unlike the restricted view taken in regard to the
purported silence of the General Assembly, the Carrel court seized on this
silence to attain its goal: the legislation did not create new law.80
Concluding that the legislation does not create new law is vastly different
from concluding that the Act does not abrogate prior law. This logical
distinction and its policy implications were not mentioned. Declaring two plus
two equals four and only four, is not the same as declaring four must always
75 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 799-800 (relying on the dissenting opinions of Justice Douglas
in Curtis v. Square-D Co., 652 N.E.2d 664 (Ohio 1995) and Byers v. Consolidated Alum.
Corp., 652 N.E.2d 643,644 (Ohio 1995)). Both majority decisions merely declare that, on
the strength of McAtiliffe, the two year statute of limitations of section 2305.10 of the
Ohio Revised Code, rather than the six year period specified in section 2305.07 of the
Ohio Revised Code, applies to product liability claims for personal injury. The virtually
identical dissenting opinions provide no reasoning beyond reference to Justice F.E.
Sweeney's dissenting opinion in McAuliffe. If the court is now declaring this core aspect
of the McAidiffe dissent valid, one must wonder whether the majority is suggesting that
McAuliffe, a properly decided case, was wrongly decided.
76 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 799.
77 McAuliffe, 651 N.E.2d at 958.
78 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 799.
79 The issue before the court in McAuliffe involved a discussion regarding which
specific statutes of limitation applied to actions brought pursuant to the Act. This issue
was far narrower than the issue of whether the Act supplanted the common law. The
"implicit" recognition relied upon by the majority in Carrel reflects a misunderstanding
of McAttliffe. Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 803 (CookJ, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
80 The Act can be viewed as creating new law. See supra note 28.
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be a function of two plus two. Neither deductive nor inductive reasoning
always works in both directions. The court created an equivalence where none
exists.
8 1
It must also be recognized that the "but for" test in McAuliffe supported the
supreme court's reasoning and holding regarding statutory modification.
Additionally, the test reinforced the court's determination that product liability
actions preceded adoption of the Act.82 In McAuliffe, unlike Carrel, the actions
under discussion were limited to the four claims described in Ohio Revised
Code section 2307.73. They did not involve allegations of common law
negligent design. These provisions unquestionably reflect a codification of
previously existing common law actions. Two of the three modifications
discussed by the court, economic loss and express warranty theory, were also
consistent with existing common law. The third modification, raising the
standard for the imposition of punitive damages, was correctly viewed as
unrelated to restricting the right to such damages; it did not create a liability, it
merely modified the applicable standard of proof.
When limited to these seven points (four causes of action and three
purported modifications), it is proper to conclude that there was a codification
rather than the requisite transformation of law and creation of a statutory cause
of action. When viewed from the perspective of the entire Act, the picture is
quite different. To the extent personal injury recovery for product claims
remains the core of the Act, it can be viewed as at least a partial codification of
common law. This justifies application of the two year personal injury statute
of limitations. Because a review of the full Act discloses (1) the creation of
liability for post-market failure to warn 83 and for misrepresentation, 84 (2) the
continuation of the statutory claims against suppliers,85 (3) and limited express
continuation of negligence theory,86 it becomes apparent that the Act creates
law and reflects an intent to preempt the field.
This analysis is consistent with Justice Cook's opinion in Carrel, which points
out that proper application of McAuliffe provides a result contrary to the
81Even a philosopher and logician as prominent as Alfred Lord Whitehead might
have had difficulty with the court's analysis in this case.
82McAuliffe, 651 N.E.2d at 960.
8 3 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.76(A)(2)(b) (Anderson 1994).
84 Section 2307.77. The statutory approach to conformance as to manufacturers'
representations builds on, but differs from, the express warranty approach of Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co., 147 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio 1958).
8 5Section 2307.78 (retaining negligence principles in actions against suppliers).
8 6Section 2307.72(D)(1)(preserving negligence claims for environmental tort
actions).
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 45 Clev. St. L. Rev. 559 1997
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
majority's view.87 The logic applied by Justice Cook, unlike the majority's, is
appropriate and pointed.
To say that the Act did not create causes of action unavailable at
common law, however, does not foreclose a determination that the Act
supplants those common-law theories. In fact, the McAuliffe court's
treatment of the Act as a codification of products liability law provides
further support for application of the rule of statutory construction set
forth in Bolles . . . and the ultimate conclusion that the common-law
cause of action of negligent design has been abrogated by the Products
Liability Act.
88
McAuliffe had nothing to do with the question of the abrogation of common
law causes of action. Only by ignoring the context of its holding and its
reasoning can it be given the interpretation found in Carrel. The decision
reached is not justified by the methodology of statutory interpretation utilized
by the court or its interpretation of McAuliffe. The outcome was, however,
absolutely predictable.
E. Assumption of the Risk
In the face of questionable statutory interpretation and a route negating the
need for constitutional analysis, the question then becomes what happened
when the court decided this case. To fully comprehend the Carrel decision's
illogical determination that statutory construction leads to a conclusion that
the legislature did not intend to abolish the common law claim for negligent
design of a product, the court's motivation must be considered. The court's
desire to continue a concept of negligent design recovery is devoid of
relationship to any constitutional concern. Rather, the purpose was to allow
injured claimants an approach which circumvents the effect of assumption of
the risk.
In actions brought pursuant to the strict liability provision of the Act, as was
the case at common law, assumption of the risk remains a complete defense.89
In some cases this would mean judgment for the defense as a matter of law
regardless of the level of assumptive conduct.90 However, under the
87 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 803 (Cook, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part).
88 Id.
89 Assumption of the risk has been a complete defense to strict liability claims since
their inception. See Onderko v. Richmond Mfg. Co., 511 N.E.2d 388 (Ohio 1987) (relying
on Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373 (Ohio 1987) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A cmt. n (1965)). Accord OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.20(B)(2) (Anderson 1994).
90Although the grant of summary judgment based on a conduct-based affirmative
defense is rare, such orders have been affirmed in proper cases. See, e.g., Riley v. Burnup
& Sims Comtec, Inc., No. 1-90-113, 1991 WL 216783 (Ohio App. Sept. 12,
1991)(negligence action); Meador v. Wagner-Smith, No. 11886, 1990 WL 73725 (Ohio
App. June 1, 1990)(product liability action). Accord Monaco v. Ohio Expositions Comm.,
659 N.E.2d 393 (Ohio Cl. Ct. 1995)(plaintiff's actions were proximate cause of harm
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comparative negligence statute upheld and effectively made retroactive by the
court,91 assumption of the risk merges with contributory negligence permiting
recovery unless and until the fact finder determines that plaintiff's conduct
caused more than fifty percent of the harm for which relief is sought.92 Posed
differently, the effect of maintaining a negligent design theory is to give injured
parties two bites of the apple when fairness dictates that one bite suffices. 93 Dr.
Pangloss would appreciate the court's approach as it truly provides injured
parties with the best of all possible worlds.
Prior precedent and language found within the Carrel opinion supports this
analysis, though the court's language may not have been intended to be quite
so revealing. The court's hostility to any effort which limits the theories under
which an injured party can seek relief was manifest in Crislip v. TCH Liquidating
Co.94 In Crislip, wrongful death and personal injury claims were predicated on
a variety of product liability theories including strict liability failure to warn.
The Crislip action involved an instruction manual that had multiple
warnings but failed to expressly state that exposure to deadly carbon monoxide
fumes could result from the venting of a gas furnace and defendant's
wood-burning add-on furnace through the same flue. The appellate court
reversed the trial court's directed verdict for the defendant and held that a strict
liability failure to warn claim could be asserted based on its own prior
decisional law.9 5 This decision was in conflict with other case law rejecting this
cause of action.96 The supreme court found its precedents misinterpreted and
sustained).
91Wilfong v. Batdorf, 451 N.E.2d 1185 (Ohio 1983).
9 2Anderson v. Ceccardi, 451 N.E.2d 780 (Ohio 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19
(Anderson 1998). Curious George would appreciate the court's failure to raise an equal
protection argument since product liability cases did not permit comparative principles
even though those principles applied to all other personal injury plaintiffs. But see OHIO
REV. CODE § 2315.20 (Anderson 1998).
93 Bite one: a strict liability statutory action which carries forward the court's
precedents easing the plaintiff's burden of proof, but exposing plaintiff to a complete
assumption of the risk defense.
Bite two: a common law negligence action which carries a higher burden of proof,
but largely negates the effect of plaintiff's assumption of the risk or contributory
negligence.
94 Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177 (Ohio 1990).
9 51d. (citing Krosky v. Ohio Edison Co., 484 N.E.2d 704 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984)). Krosky
was predicated on a strained reading of leading decisions such as Seley v. G.D. Searle
& Co., 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981), and Temple, 364 N.E.2d 267.
96 See, e.g., Hardiman v. Zep Mfg. Co., 470 N.E.2d 941 (Ohio App. 1984). Hardiman
represented the prevailing view based on language found in Leichtamer v. American
Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981) and Temple, 364 N.E.2d 267, which held (1)
failure to warn claims must be predicated on negligence, and (2) the presence of an
adequate warning is a defense to a claim of strict liability. Accord Overbee v. Van Waters
& Rogers, 706 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1983)(discussing Ohio law).
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taken out of context by those courts which held an action for failure to warn in
strict liability was precluded. The court, in establishing the cause of action,
recognized "the standard imposed upon the defendant in a strict liability claim
grounded upon an inadequate warning is the same as that imposed in a negligence
claim based upon inadequate warning."
97
The Crislip decision did not open the courthouse to a plaintiff that could not
otherwise reach the door, and it did not ease the plaintiff's burden of proof. The
reason for adopting this cause of action was made manifest by the court:
We do not mean to suggest that a cause of action for negligent failure
to warn or warn adequately is identical to one brought under strict
liability. One important difference concerns the availability of
comparative negligence as a defense in the two types of action. A
finding of comparative negligence.., in a cause of action for negligent
failure to warn.., reduces the amount of damages awarded,... [if
plaintiff is partially at fault]. However, comparative negligence cannot
be raised as a defense to a cause of action in strict liability.
9 8
In other words, the court found a way to allow a plaintiff a strong likelihood
of success by abolishing the defense of contributory negligence. 99 The
reasoning candidly removes a defense without even seeking to establish a
difference in the two forms of action. Despite the language of "one important
difference," the only difference is in the abolition of an essential defense. This
approach, a change in the substantive law which has a surface aura of creating
a cause of action but which actually is directed to the elimination of a defense,
comports fully with the court's policy objectives. It is, however, in direct
contravention of the General Assembly's policy objectives. This is precisely the
approach taken in Carrel. Its adoption of a negligence theory allows for
application of comparative negligence, including assumption of the risk, where
otherwise a determination that plaintiff had assumed any part of the risk would
result in a judgment for the defense. In both cases the decision favored the
injured party. Carrel makes clear that this was precisely the cause of this
otherwise illogical decision. In a note the court observes:
The doctrine of assumption of the risk also applies to appellant's
negligent design claim. However, as applied to this claim the plaintiff's
assumption of the risk is not a complete bar to recovery. Instead, it
operates to reduce his recovery if the jury finds that the assumption of
97 Crislip, 556 N.E.2d at 1183 (emphasis added).
981d. The court, therefore, noted that the failure to instruct the jury on a strict liability
theory was harmless error.
99 Contributory negligence and assumption of the risk have been merged for
purposes of comparative negligence. See stipra note 8. Contributory negligence is not a
defense to strict liability actions. Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d 373,377-78 (Ohio 1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965), adopted in Temple v. Wean United,
Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1977).
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the risk amounted to fifty percent or less of the total responsibility for
the injuries incurred.1
Rejecting the contention that Crerneans v. Willniar Henderson Manufacturing
Co. 101 abolished assumption of the risk in all product liability cases involving
a work-related injury, the court also managed to create ambiguity in its
discussion. Immediately after this rejection, the court declared: "[however, we
find that this defense is unavailable in those situations where the job duties
require the employee to encounter the risk, and the employee is injured while
engaging in normal job-related duties. " 102 The rejection and its qualification
create a murky situation. This reasoning creates problems requiring further
definition. The reasoning suggests that virtually any plaintiff bringing a
product liability claim where the injury occurred within the scope of
employment is immune from an assumption of the risk defense. "Normal job
duties" remains an undefined and possibly undefinable phrase.103 The
statement that "the defense in not available when the employee is required to
encounter the risk while performing normal job duties 104 contains another
element of ambiguity: just when is an employee "required" to encounter a risk?
In Carrel the court found that these issues required a jury determination. Yet
there was no evidence that the employer required (at least not in any recognized
definition of the term) Mr. Carrel to ignore safety precautions with which he
was familiar.105 An employee can be required to perform a task yet assume a
risk in doing so where that risk is avoidable. Unlike the seminal case of Cepeda
v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 106 where an employee was ordered to operate a
10OCarrel, 677 N.E.2d at 801 n.5 (citations omitted).
10 1Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1991).
102 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 801.
103 Courts have consistently struggled to define the somewhat similar terms, "arising
out of' and "in the course of employment" for purposes of workers' compensation
claims. But as to these terms:
No precise formula can be laid down, however, which will auto-
matically solve every case insofar as these factors are determina-
tive, since the "sphere of the employment" is variable in extent,
depending upon the nature of the particular work.. . each case
must be determined in view of its peculiar facts and circumstances.
93 OHIO JUR. 3d, Workers' Compensation § 115 (1989) (citations omitted). See also MTD
Prods. Inc. v. Robatin, 572 N.E.2d 661 (Ohio 1991); Durbin v. Ohio Bureau of Workers'
Comp., 677 N.E.2d 1234 (Ohio App. 1996); Childers v. Whirlpool Corp., 665 N.E.2d 256
(Ohio App. 1995); Woodrum v. Premier Auto Glass Co., 660 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio App.
1995); Fletcher v. Northwest Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 599 N.E.2d 822 (Ohio App.
1991); Delker v. Ohio Edison Co., 546 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio App. 1989).
104 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 801.
105 See infra note 103.
106 Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 386 A.2d 816 (N.J. 1978).
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machine without its safety guard, i.e. required to assume the risk, no such
employer mandated action appears in Carrel.
Similarly, no such requirement appeared in Freas v. Prater Construction
Corp.107 In Freas, plaintiff's decedent (Blankenship) ignored warnings and
instructions regarding the proper means of removing the boom from a crane,
a task within his normal job duties. Nevertheless, the court had no difficulty in
affirming a summary judgment in favor of the defense. The holding was based
on a determination that the warnings were adequate as a matter of law and
that no evidence demonstrated that the defendant's actions were the proximate
cause of the harm involved.108 The opinion failed to directly address
assumption of the risk which is, of course, what happens when a party fails to
heed an adequate warning. Nevertheless, the court was well aware of this
relationship, noting there was no need for additional warnings because
"Blankenship was required to read the manual and was seen reading it. The
record indicates that Blankenship, in fact, knew the relevant dangers if one should
stand under the boom.' 109 This at least suggests the viability of assumption of
the risk as a valid alternative approach.
The question then becomes whether the Carrel court applied a proper
interpretation of the Crerneans assumption of the risk standard,110 or modified
the definition of assumption of the risk to further limit the potential of this
defense. 111 The court's demand that plaintiff not only appreciate the existence
of a risk of harm, but also that he "appreciate the full danger of the press,"112
may create a situation in which lower courts conclude an injured party's
appreciation of.danger is insufficiently "full" to allow for jury consideration of
this affirmative defense. To the extent this occurs, the defense has been
judicially eviscerated. A jury charge that requires plaintiff's "full appreciation
of all danger" associated with a product is a far cry from the current Ohio jury
instruction. 1
13
10 7 Freas v. Prater Construction Corp., 573 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 1991).
108 1d. at 31-32. The court also reiterated the standard for failure to warn liability was
identical whether sounding in strict liability or in negligence. Id. at n.1.
109 1d. at 31 (emphasis added).
1 1OCremeans, 566 N.E.2d at 1203.
1 11The failure of the court to even mention Freas suggests that either (1) the assertion
that Freas contains an implicit assumption of the risk aspect is not well taken, or (2) the
court chose to ignore this implication as it led to a conclusion in conflict with its desired
outcome.
1 12 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 801.
1131 OHIO JURY INSTRUCrIONS § 9.50(2)(1996) provides:
IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK. The defendant claims that
the plaintiff impliedly assumed the risk of injury if he/she had know-
ledge of a condition that was obviously dangerous to him/her, and
voluntarily exposed himself/herself to that risk of injury.
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Taking all of these factors into account, the conclusions are more than a bit
terrifying. An assumption of the risk defense is theoretically available, but as
a practical matter, it is unlikely that any set of facts will uphold a defense
judgment predicated on the defense. If the judgment was as a matter of law,
the court will find a jury issue existed and, if by the jury, the court will rule the
defense should have been stricken as a matter of law.
114
The facts in Carrel show that the plaintiff was well aware of the dangers
encountered in adjusting the press on which he was working and that he was
fully aware of how to prevent the harm that occurred.11 5 His actual knowledge
and experience equalled or exceeded that of plaintiff's decedent in Freas. This
would appear to be conduct comprising assumption of the risk as a matter of
law. That is, of course, unless the definitions of "full appreciation," "required,"
and "normal job duties" collectively mean assumption of the risk has been
abolished in all work-related product liability actions, which is the effect of the
Carrel decision. This result is wrong in law, logic, and policy. The likelihood of
successfully raising an assumption of the risk defense in such cases has become
virtually impossible.1
16
This Carrel result is remarkable since all members of the court agreed upon
the applicable law as that expressed by Justice Brown's concurring opinion to
1l4 Altematively, the court could openly declare its end objective by holding that
assumption of the risk is not an available defense in work-related product liability
actions. Instead of this direct route, the court has written its own version of Joseph
Heller's CATCH 22.
115The key facts, as summarized by Justice Cook, were: Carrel was an experienced
press operator. He was aware of the risk of injury if he placed his hand in the die space
without taking precautions to prevent the press from cycling. He knew the press was
equipped with several safety features which would prevent this occurrence. He knew
that the safety horn sound was hard to distinguish from other machine sounds, and he
knew that the size of the press made it impossible for him to see the co-employee who
was in charge of controlling the press. Nevertheless, Carrel bypassed all of the safety
features, not even pulling the safety cord as instructed by his employer, and exposed
his hand within the die space. 677 N.E.2d at 804. Plaintiff recognized that he was "a
knowledgeable press operator." Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 5 Carrel (No. 95-1773).
During an extensive description of the safety defects in the press, plaintiff also
acknowledged the importance of keeping one's hands out of the die space. Id. at 6-16.
116 Although defense counsel should continue to raise assumption of the risk as an
affirmative defense in such cases, doing so may now contain the risk of sanction under
OHIO R. Civ. P. 11. Even before the exacerbation of the problem posed by Carrel, the
Cremeans court declared "[w]hile not completely abolishing the defense of [assumption
of the risk], the court leaves manufacturers little recourse when an employee brings a
strict products liability suit." Samuel R. Guelli, The Status of Assumption of the Risk in
Product Liability in Ohio After Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg., 566 N.E.2d 1203
(Ohio 1991), 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 243, 255, (1992) quoted in Colboch v. Uniroyal Tire
Co., 670 N.E.2d 1366, 1373 (Ohio App. 1996)(affirming the trial court's refusal to give
an assumption of the risk jury instruction, though stating that the defense remains
available in product liability work-related cases).
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Cremeans,1 7 This concurrence makes clear that the defense is not abolished and
that a distinction must be made between "cases where the employee has elected
to use a defective product (where the defense is viable) and those where the
use of a defective product has been forced upon an employee by economic
necessity (where the defense is precluded).11 8 The proper focus recognizes that
"[violition is the touchstone.' 119 Even in its review of the areas in which genuine
issues of material fact were said to exist, the majority opinion makes no mention
of this controlling element.
1 20
Justice Brown's approach in Cremneans framed the issue as whether an action
was voluntary or one which the employee had to accept since rejection of the
risk could mean a reduced likelihood of job advancement or even the loss of
the job. Justice Brown found that the question of whether Cremeans assumed
the risk was for the jury. In reaching this conclusion he rejected the majority
conclusion that assumption of the risk was not available because Crerneans'
injury occurred in the performance of normal job duties. If the majority in Carrel
applied the law as stated by Justice Brown, it could not have focused its opinion
as it did, nor could it have found a fact issue. Rather, by focusing on the volition
touchstone, it would have been forced to conclude that summary judgment
was correct because "[aibsent employer compulsion forcing Carrel to take such
a risk, a factor that Carrel has not attempted to demonstrate, his assumption of
the risk was voluntary.1121
Proper application of Crerneans required an affirmance of the Court of
Appeals' dismissal of the action.122 There was no evidence to support a claim
that Carrel ignored the danger due to compulsion. Carrel failed to meet his
burden of proof on this point. The existence of a defect which caused the danger
did not call for a different answer; absent a defect, the question of assumption
was not reached. The existence of a defect is irrelevant to consideration of
affirmative defenses which assume its existence. 123 The only valid questions
117 "We believe that Justice Brown's concurrence sets forth the applicable law." Carrel,
677 N.E.2d at 801. "I agree with the majority that Justice Brown's concurring opinion in
Cremeans ... sets forth the applicable law for employee assumption of the risk in the
workplace." Id. at 803 (Cook, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part).
118 Cremeans, 566 N.E.2d at 1209-10 (Brown, J. concurring).
119 d. at 1210.
120 Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 801.
121 Id. at 804 (Cook, J. dissenting in part and concurring in part).
122 1f, however, there is a common law action for negligent design, the extent of
plaintiff's contribution to the harm will be predicated on comparative negligence. Only
in rare cases would judgment as a matter of law be possible. See supra note 90. This is
precisely what the majority opinion was seeking.
123 The members of the majority were certainly aware of this, but focused their analysis
on the presence of defect as here there were fact issues. Carrel, 677 N.E.2d at 801. Had
summary judgment been based on the absence of a defect, a reversal would have been
merited.
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are whether plaintiff was aware of the danger arising from that defect and
whether plaintiff voluntarily chose to encounter that risk.
By choosing not to address this question, the court was able to accomplish
its ultimate purpose of providing an injured product user with an opportunity
to recover from a manufacturer who, at least arguably, provided a defective
product. Injured parties now have the opportunity for two bites of the apple
where good public policy would limit them to the one bite permitted by a strict
liability theory. Whether the distortion of law necessary to gain this objective
was too high a price to pay is a different question. The price was much too high.
III. A NEW WRONGFUL DEATH ACT - COLLINS V. SOTKA
A. Background and Holding
In 1808, Lord Ellenborough sitting at nisi prius, stated that a civil court could
not consider the death of a person as an injury.124 This ruling was widely
adopted in the United States.125 Almost a century later it was adopted as part
of the law of Ohio.126 Despite the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Collins v.
Sotka, 127 the underlying principle (that a wrongful death claim is the creation
of the legislature and does not exist at common law) remains the governing
law.
Collins presented the court with an opportunity to reconsider its historical
deference to the right of the General Assembly to limit wrongful death actions
in light of the fact that this was, from its inception, a statutory right.128 The case
presented an unusual fact pattern in that the death of plaintiff's decedent did
not arise from a product defect or traditional negligence based tort action. Suit
was filed against Sotka, the person who had abducted and killed a
seventeen-year old member of the plaintiffs' family. The abduction took place
on or about July 31, 1992 and decedent's body was discovered on December
15, 1992.129 The coroner ultimately set the date of death as July 31, the date of
decedent's disappearance. On January 4,1993, a secret indictment was handed
down against defendant Sotka. On February 5, 1993, Sotka pled guilty to
several charges including the aggravated murder of plaintiffs' decedent.
Thereafter, on February 6, 1995, pursuant to Ohio Revised Code section
2305.02, the wrongful death action was filed.130 The Court of Appeals affirmed
124 Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808).
125 STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 2D, § 1.1 n.2 (1975).
12 6Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., v. Chambers, 76 N.E. 91, affd, 207 U.S. 142 (1905).
12 7Collins v. Sotka, 692 N.E.2d 581 (Ohio 1998).
12 8"Without those [wrongful death] statutes, there would be no cause of action for
wrongful death in Ohio." Collins v. Yanity, 237 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ohio 1968) (relying on
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co., v. Hine, 25 Ohio St. 629 (1874)).
129 Collins, 692 N.E.2d at 581.
1301d. at 581-82.
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a Summary Judgment predicated on the grounds that the complainant was not
filed within two years from the date of death.1 31 This ruling was consistent with
a body of decisional law which held that "the two-year limitations period is a
restriction which qualifies the right of action itself and is not merely a time
limitation upon the remedy."1 32 As this claim was filed beyond the two year
period which commenced at the date of death, July 31, 1992, the lower courts
were compelled to dismiss the action.
These decisions were reversed in an opinion that applied the discovery rule
announced in O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp.1 33 The court observed that "In
deciding whether the discovery rule can be used to toll R.C. 2125.02(D), the two
year statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim, we must revisit our
decision in Shover v. Cordis Corp."134 Shover,135 unlike Collins, involved a
product liability claim.136 The overruling of Shover carried with it the entire line
of decisions which had previously held that the two year period was a
limitation on the right to bring the action as distinct from a statute of
limitations. This long overdue result was reached in an opinion focused on
policy concerns that mandated application of the discovery rule. The court
determined that the result in Shover was "ludicrous" and so deeply flawed that
it had to be overruled.1 37 The court stated the new law:
we hold that the discovery rule applies to toll R.C. 2125.02(D), the
two-year statute of limitations for a wrongful death claim. [Where
death results from a murder] the statute of limitations begins to run
when the victim's survivor's discover, or through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered [that defendant was
convicted and sentenced].
138
By any rational reading of Collins, an identical rule now exists for a product
liability based wrongful death action. The rule announced is consistent with
131 d.at 582.
132Taylor v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (Ohio 1984). See also
Bazdar v. Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ohio 1981), appeal dismissed, 705 F.2d
451 (6th cir. 1982); Keaton v. Ribbeck, 391 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio 1979); Burris v. Romaker,
595 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio App. 1991).
1330'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 447 N.E.2d 727 (1983).
134Collins, 692 N.E.2d at 582.
135Shover v. Cordis Corp., 574 N.E.2d 457 (Ohio 1991).
136 A defective pacemaker allegedly caused decedent's death. Id. Approximately four
years later decedent's son read a newspaper article stating that the pacemaker's
manufacturer had pled guilty to a charge of concealing its defect. Id. Shortly thereafter,
but well beyond the two year period specified in the Act, an action was commenced. Id.
The court affirmed a dismissal of the action holding that neither fraud nor a discovery
rule could toll the two year period. Id.
137 Collins, 692 N.E.2d at 584.
1 3 8 1d. at 585.
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the personal injury limitation period set forth in Ohio Revised Code section
2305.10 and the court's post O'Stricker jurisprudence. 139
B. Right Result, Wrong Reason
In reaching its decision to engraft a discovery rule into Ohio Revised Code
section 2125.02(D), and thereby negate a substantial body of preexisting law,
the court relied on both logic and important policy concerns. First, the
Wrongful Death Act requires that any claim be predicated on a wrongful act.
In Collins, the court recognized that the fact of death has no relevance to
whether death was caused by wrongful conduct.1 40 Death gains relevance, in
terms of a cause of action, only after the wrongful conduct has been discovered.
Therefore, death by itself, cannot trigger a statute of limitations 1 41 This logic
is equally applicable to product related wrongful death claims. In Shover, until
the son learned of the existence of purported defects in his father's pacemaker,
the father's death could not trigger a statute of limitations.
Second, the court recognized that it misconstrued its own precedents in
deciding Shover, because it relied on a belief that the discovery rule was
traditionally linked to malpractice claims. 142 After describing a number of cases
to establish that this narrow perspective was incorrect, the court focused on the
need to liberally construe the time when a cause of action accrues where the
injury complained of did not immediately manifest. In such situations the court
had previously recognized that it was "unconscionable" to bar an injured
party's right to recovery with a statute of limitations before plaintiff even knew
of the injury and its cause.143
Finally, relying on the Shover dissent, the court recognized that a tortfeasor
need only fraudulently conceal the cause of death for two years to be absolved
of civil liability.144 A failure to learn of this linkage need have no relation to
fraudulent concealment. Exposure to a wide variety of toxic substances -
chemicals, minerals, drugs - may result in substantial injury only after the
passage of far more than two years. Even where injury manifests within two
years of exposure, it may not be possible to link the resultant injury to a given
product within that time frame. 145 Neither manufacturers nor science may
139See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 649 N.E.2d 175 (Ohio 1995);
Liddell v. SCA Servs., 635 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio 1994); Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609 N.E.2d
140 (Ohio 1993).
140Collins, 692 N.E.2d at 583.
141 Id.
142ld.
14 3 1d. at 584.
144 Collins, 692 N.E.2d at 584 (relying on and quoting Shover, 574 N.E.2d at 471)
(Douglas, J. dissenting).
145 For example, numerous allegations of birth defects have been attributed to the drug
Bendectin. Many, perhaps all, of the persons whose children first suffered this alleged
injury had no inkling of the potential problem until the passage of more than two years
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have reason to know or suspect such dangers until well after the initial effects
are recognized.
Prior to Collins, the court's approach to the Act's two year commencement
period gave it the same effect as a statute of repose. The law precluded a cause
of action before it was possible for the injured party to plead a prima facie case.
The "limitation" on the right was, in fact and law, the exclusion of the right. This
result was consistent with the Alice in Wonderland, topsy-turvy approach so
magnificently described over forty-five years ago. 146
The efforts of the General Assembly to justify the constitutionality of its
express and more liberal statute of repose in the amended Wrongful Death Act
will not succeed.1 47 Any statute of repose is too perverse to pass constitutional
muster under Ohio law. No policy advanced by the General Assembly can
overcome the importance of the policies expressed in Carrel.
The court's conclusion was right. The problem is that the court failed to reach
its logical and policy directed result in a reasoned and valid manner. The means
negated much of the value of the ends. Despite a laudable end result,
application of a discovery rule to the statutory period in which a wrongful
death action may be brought, the manner in which this objective was reached
was improper. The court grossly misinterpreted the language of the Wrongful
Death Act, when it determined that the "commence action" language was a
statute of limitations.
As long recognized by the court, principles of statutory interpretation,
demand that the words of a legislative enactment be given their plain meaning
in accord with, legislative intent. The Collins dissent aptly noted "[w]here a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce the statute as written.
The court may not add to or subtract from the language of the statute."148
This principle consistently led the court to find that the words "shall be
commenced within two years after decedent's death" mean precisely what they
from the child's birth. As late as 1995, after remand from the Supreme Court of the
United States, it was held that the evidence supporting a relationship between Bendectin
and birth defects was too unreliable to be considered by a jury and that, therefore, the
drug manufacturer was entitled to Summary Judgment. Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
14 6Except in topsy-turvy land, you can't die before you are conceived,
or be divorced before ever you marry.., or miss a train running on
a non-existent railroad. For substantially similar reasons, it has always
heretofore been accepted, as a sort of logical "axiom" that a statute
of limitations does not begin to run against a cause of action before
that cause of action exists.
Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J. dissenting).
147See H.B. 350 § 5(L) (1996). Section 5(L)(1) declares that the General Assembly
"respectfully disagrees [with court holdings] that a statute of repose violates Section 16,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution." Id. The only government entity empowered to reach
such a conclusion is the court. There is little to no possibility that the respectful
disagreement will end by acceptance of the General Assembly's belief.
148Collins, 692 N.E.2d at 586 (Moyer, C.J. dissenting).
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say. Heretofore, these words have meant: the right to bring a wrongful death
claim is limited by a specified time frame. No such right could accrue after the
passage of this time period. It was, and is, a restriction that qualifies the right
of action as distinct from a time limitation. In contract terms, bringing the action
within two years of the date of death is a condition precedent.
Rather than addressing the only rational meaning of the term, or even
attempting to attack its logic, the majority opinion ignored it. From its statement
that "[t]he discovery rule applies to toll R.C. 2125.02(D), the two-year statute
of limitations for a wrongful death claim," to the last paragraph of the majority
opinion declaring "we find that it was filed within the statute of limitations,
" 149
there is no mention of the fact that, until this opinion, it was not a statute of
limitations. Here, though perhaps it is not a rose, a rose by any other name is
a completely different flower.
Compounding the error is the complete absence of any effort to define a
statute of repose or a statute of limitations and to illustrate where the statutory
language falls within these definitions. Nowhere does the legislative language
reference a time within which to bring suit after a cause of action accrues - the
common definition of a statute of limitations. The legislative language provides
that all claims shall commence within a set time (two-years) after a specific
event (death). A statute of repose establishes just such an event based time
frame. Had the court declared this simple truth, it could have addressed the
underlying problems of the Wrongful Death Act.
The rather unique facts of Collins also permitted the Plaintiff to have brought
the action within the requisite time frame. Suit could have been filed upon any
number of earlier events such as the time decedent's body was found, upon
the final coroner's ruling as to date of death, or indictment of defendant Sotka.
In this civil action, a Complaint could have been filed against a Doe defendant.
This Complaint could then have been amended and served in time to fully
protect Plaintiff's interests.150 Plaintiff in Collins had a means to protect the
cause of action, as there was no need to await a guilty verdict in the criminal
action. 15 1 The designation of Doe defendants is a common practice in civil
actions and is frequently observed in product liability claims. The failure to do
so in Collins is no different from the failure of any Plaintiff whose action is
dismissed as untimely pursuant to an applicable statute of limitations.
Had the court taken this route, it could have reiterated the claimant's
obligation to meet their responsibilities under the civil rules, and the court
14 91d. at 585.
15 0See OHio R. Crv. P. 3 and 15(D). In his dissent, Chief Justice Moyer more fully
explains that proper utilization of these rules would have permitted the action. Collins,
692 N.E.2d at 587-90. The majority approach, setting the discovery date at the date of
conviction, defies logic and ignores the different evidentiary standards applicable to
criminal and civil matters. The only justification for this date selection was, that under
the circumstances, it was the only date that permitted the action to go forward. Perhaps
that is logic enough.
15 1 Id. at 589.
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could have used dicta to make clear to the General Assembly, the lower courts,
and attorneys that this provision of the Act would be declared
unconstitutional. 15 2 Advance warning of future rulings is a recognized feature
of our judicial decision making process. 153 This approach would have left
Collins without a remedy.154 The cost of this effect, however unpleasant, would
have been outweighed by a decision which observed the law. The court, of
course, concluded that this price was too high.
C. Right Result, Right Reason
Rather than place reliance on a new and unsupportable characterization of
the commencement language of the Act, the court should have exercised the
type of judicial review it has utilized in prior decisions. The court should have
created a common law action to supplement the Wrongful Death Act, or it
should have held the entire Act unconstitutional to permit the creation of a
common law action similar to that set forth in H.B. 350 absent its repose
provision. Precedent exists for either approach.
Had the court taken such an approach to its objective, the previous critical
analysis of Collins would have been inappropriate. Either of these more direct
routes could have placed initial reliance upon the reasoning and holding of
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.155 In Moragne the United States Supreme
Court recognized that the English rule lacked merit. It rejected the rule and
established a non-statutory common law right to bring a wrongful death claim
under maritime law.1
56
152 1n Shover the court recognized that the legislative branch could change the law,
and thus it deferred to the General Assembly. 574 N.E.2d at 462. Collins could have been
utilized to make a clarion call to the General Assembly declaring: "NO statutes of
repose." This call would certainly have been heeded by attorneys and the lower courts
so that no wrongful death claimant would have been deprived of the right to bring suit
where a discovery rule would have permitted that action to proceed.
153This can be accomplished through dicta or through concurring or even dissenting
opinions. Is there any real doubt that the court, assuming its current majority remains
in place, will soon "straighten out the punitive damages question as it relates to wrongful
death"? Collins, 692 N.E.2d at 585 (Douglas, J. concurring). This remedy limitation was
upheld in Rubeck v. Huffman, 374 N.E.2d 411,413 (Ohio 1978) (relying on the statutory
nature of the right and the power of the General Assembly to limit such rights).
154The court has recognized that there are limitations which can preclude a remedy
even for a completely innocent injured party. In a negligent infliction of emotional
distress action brought on behalf of a woman improperly diagnosed as being HIV
positive, the court upheld a dismissal of the action, declaring "the facts of this case
remind us that not every wrong is deserving of legal remedy." Heiner v. Moretuzzo, 652
N.E.2d 664, 670 (1995) (Douglas, J.).
155Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
15 6Id. at 409.
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The Ohio Wrongful Death Act does not expressly indicate that it provides
the exclusive remedy for such harm. 157 Therefore, the court could have created
a parallel common law action. This was the approach taken in Carrel, where
the court acted in disregard of statutory language mandating that the product
liability claims provided in the Product Liability Act were exclusive. 158 This
exact approach was appropriately taken in regard to the Ohio Comparative
Negligence statute. 15 9
In its initial review of this important change in the law, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that, as a substantive modification of existing law, the statute's
terms could not be given retroactive effect. 160 Shortly thereafter, the court was
given the opportunity to reconsider its decision, and it adopted a common law
rule of comparative negligence. 161 As a judicial creation, the law gained the
legislatively precluded retroactive application.
In a concurring opinion, emphasis was placed on the principle that
improving the law of Ohio did not require a rigid adherence to principles of
stare decisis and that, "[b]ad law created by a court, even though only a day old,
should be overruled by the creating court as soon as it recognizes the bad
law.' 162 Although it took the Ohio General Assembly considerably longer to
recognize that parts of the Wrongful Death Act contained bad law, that
recognition dawned.
H.B. 350163 amended Ohio Revised Code section 2125.02. Perhaps the most
significant change in the new provision was the language mandating that "[a]n
157 Although the statute implies exclusivity, implication would not seem to be a
sufficient basis to find that, as a matter of law, it was intended as the exclusive remedy.
Note, too, that in Carrel the legislation modified a body of pre-existing common law,
whereas the Wrongful Death Act created a cause of action which did not exist at the
common law. Despite its importance, this distinction will not be outcome determinative.
158 See discussion infra Part II.
159OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Anderson 1998).
160 See Straub v. Voss, 438 N.E.2d 888 (Ohio 1982) overruled by, Wilfong v. Batdorf, 451
N.E.2d 1185 (Ohio 1983); and Viers v. Dunlap, 438 N.E.2d 881 (Ohio 1982), overruled by,
Wilfong v. Batdorf, 451 N.E.2d 1185 (Ohio 1983).
161 Wilfong v. Batdorf, 451 N.E.2d 1185 (Ohio 1983), overruled in part by, Van Fossen v.
Babcock, 522 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 1988). This partial overruling did not restore viability to
Straub or Viers. The Wilfong court declared:
This court now adopts the comparative negligence standard set
forth in R.C. 2315.19 as a modification of the common-law standard
in Ohio. Such modification will avoid the harshness of an arbitrary
date of enforcement of R.C. 2315.19 .... No longer will discussions
or arguments develop over whether R.C. 2315.19 is procedural or
substantive. The characterization of R.C. 2315.19 as either will not
alter the common law in Ohio which, as of today, recognizes a doctrine
of comparative negligence consistent with R.C. 2315.19.
451 N.E.2d at 1189.
162Wilfong, 451 N.E.2d at 1190 (J. P. Celebrezze, concurring).
163See discussion supra Part I.
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action for wrongful death shall be commenced within two years after the
decedent's death. " 164 This language was continued in H.B. 350s amended
Wrongful Death Act, but was substantially qualified by the addition of sections
2125.02(D)(2)(a) through (f). These sub-sections comprised a major change in
the law. The time to commence an action for wrongful death predicated on a
product liability claim is fifteen years where the claim could not have been filed
within the two year period due to a disability (pursuant to Ohio Revised Code
section 2305.16) or because the death was caused by a substance described in
Ohio Revised Code section 2305.10. The Wrongful Death Act, as amended by
H.B. 350, contains a "discovery" based statute of limitations coupled with a
fifteen year statute of repose.
Despite the fact that Collins involved the commencement period where death
was caused by murder rather than by a product defect, the court could have
used the amended section 2305.02 as a model for a common law action in
precisely the manner that comparative negligence legislation was utilized by
the Wilfong court. The court needed only to declare that it was now adopting a
common-law right to recover for wrongful death which would parallel the new
legislation. That would have permitted the court to grant relief, under a
discovery rule, to Plaintiffs in Carrel,165 in Shover, and in virtually all other
similar cases where identification of the tortfeasor was delayed for reasons
beyond control of the plaintiff or for latent defect and disease based product
liability claims.
Alternatively, the court could have declared the limitation period or the
entire Act unconstitutional. This would have forced the court to create a
common-law action. Again, that action could have modeled on the amended
version of section 2125.02 while striking its repose provision.
The constitutional attack on this aspect of the Wrongful Death Act, being
mounted in Ohio Academy of Trial Lawvyers 166 is likely to succeed on both equal
protection and open court grounds. 167 Because a substantial body of personal
injury tort actions do not permit a statute of repose, it is hard to imagine that
wrongful death victims represent a rational class which can be subject to such
1 64
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2325.02(D) (Anderson 1998).
165This assumes adherence to the flawed date selected by the court for
commencement of the statutory period.
1660hio Academy of Trial Lawyers, 689 N.E.2d 971. See discussion infra Part I.
167This is not to say that other grounds cannot be asserted including due process and
the right to trial by jury. For a fuller discussion of the constitutional infirmities of statutes
of repose, with emphasis on the Congressional approach, see Stephen J. Werber, The
Constitutional Dimension of a National Products Liability Statute of Repose, 40 VILL. L. REV.
985 (1995). See also Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of
Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L. REV. 579 (1981); Jerry J. Phillips, An
Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N. CAR. L. REV.
663 (1978); David Schuman, Tile Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMPLE L.Q. 1197 (1992).
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a provision.168 Such an argument, in light of the approach and policy rational
of Collins, can no longer be avoided, based on the principle that the legislature
can control the actions which it created.169 The Collins approach simply flanks
this position. Without this line of argument, it is illogical to conclude that those
who suffer death, the most serious injury, can be given less protection than
those who sustain lesser injuries.
The open court provision provides an even stronger argument.170 The court
has struck down a ten year repose provision, applicable to those who made
improvements in real property, by demanding that as an absolute minimum
plaintiffs "have a reasonable time to seek compensation after the accident."17 1
In its review of the personal injury statute of limitations, the court stressed that
this statute could not begin to run before a party knew or should have known
of the injury.172 Moreover, the legislature can not regulate the time in which to
bring an action until the potential claimant has reason to know of both the
injury and its cause. 173 The open court provision commands that a party be
granted an opportunity to seek relief at a "meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner."174
In any case where the latency period prior to onset of illness caused by a toxic
substance exceeds the statutory fifteen year period of amended section 2125.02
(D)(2), or where a product defect which caused death is of such a nature that
the time frame passes before there is reason to know of a specific defect's
relation to the death, a claimant will be deprived of the "meaningful" time and
manner of seeking relief. Even though such potential is exceptional, 175 the
168Personal injury actions are subject to a discovery rule with no statute of repose
pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10. The court has ruled that the discovery
period could not commence based on a mere possibility. Burgess v. Eli Lilly & Co., 609
N.E.2d 140 (Ohio 1993).
16 9See Werber, 69 TEMPLE L. REV. at 1177-78.
17 0This argument applies whether section 2125.02 is viewed in its original form or
under the H.B. 350 amendment which contains an express statute of repose.
17 1Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425,430 (Ohio 1994) (applying 01o CONST.,
art. I, § 16).
172 Burgess, 609 N.E.2d at 141-42 (relying on Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626
(Ohio 1987)). See also, NCR Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 649 N.E.2d 175
(Ohio 1995); Liddell v. SCA Services, Inc., 635 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio 1994); Gaines v.
Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987); O'Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 447
N.E.2d 727 (Ohio 1983).
173 Burgess, 609 N.E.2d at 142.
1741d. (quoting Hardy).
175The likelihood of being unable to identify a murderer within two to three years
after the crime is discovered is probably no more remote than a product defect related
injury remaining undiscoverable for fifteen years. The exceptional nature of the facts in
Collins did not deter the court. No such deterrence is likely when the court considers
section 2125.02(D)(2).
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court will not be detered from declaring a violation of the open court provision,
no matter how sound the factual and policy support for the limitation.
Either of these approaches would have permitted the court to avoid the
flawed reasoning that supported its proper conclusion in Collins. When the
merits of H.B. 350 are determined, the court should take a more forthright
position in regard to the Wrongful Death Act. Although the court should
overturn this provision, other significant and highly important provisions
enacted through H.B. 350 should not fail. Despite some flaws,176 H.B. 350
represents a balanced approach to resolution of the conflict between those who
are entitled to relief for harm caused by product defects, the rights of those who
manufacture and sell products, and the contribution to harm made by the
injured party.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Supreme Court has promoted a policy favoring compensation for
injured parties. In many cases, such as adoption of strict liability in tort,177 and
enhanced injury or crashworthiness theory,178 this judicial objective has
yielded law of great benefit to all residents of Ohio. In some instances, however,
the court has taken unto itself the task of speaking for the people where that
role is more appropriately assigned to the General Assembly.
The court's haste to hear argument regarding the validity of H.B. 350, a
consequence of its questionable assertion of mandamus jurisdiction in State ex
rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, gives every appearance that it will
result in a decision which subverts legislative intent and, to a great extent, will
be detrimental to residents of Ohio and those who do business in this State. It
is likely that a narrow majority of the court will invalidate substantial portions
of this product liability reform effort.
176 Examples of such flaws include (1) retaining assumption of the risk as a complete
defense in product liability claims, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.20(B)(2)(Anderson
1998), rather than having this defense merged with contributory negligence as it is for
other personal injury cases pursuant to § 2315.19(2); (2) retaining any form of joint and
several liability, in contravention of the right to trial by jury, where a verdict is
predicated on comparative negligence; and (3) excluding punitive damages from any
recovery under the Wrongful Death Act.
177 The principle, though not the name, was initially adopted in Lonzrick v. Republic
Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1966). The strict liability doctrine, as defined in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Ohio 1965) was adopted in Temple v. Wean,
Inc., 364 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1977).
178 Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 267 (1981). More recent
decisions of such benefit are illustrated by McAuliffe v. Western States Import Co., 651
N.E.2d 957 (1995) (two year statute of limitations applicable to product liability claims);
Freas v. Prater Constr. Corp. Inc., 573 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio 1991) (assumption of the risk can
apply in intentional tort actions); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 523
N.E.2d 489 (1988) (use of circumstantial evidence to establish product defect); and Paugh
v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759 (Ohio 1983)(allowing claim for negligent infliction of emotional
distress without contemporaneous physical injury).
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Carrel v. Allied Products Corporation represents just such an assumption of
judicial power. This decision distorts the Product Liability Act and its
legislative intent to reestablish a negligent design cause of action which the
court itself recognizes as imposing a greater burden upon injured parties than
does the law set forth by the General Assembly. Written to avoid the application
of assumption of the risk as a complete defense in product liability claims,
Carrel reduces the responsibility of a party for his or her own actions. The
unrecognized effect of this ruling is to take us one step further into a society
that is quick to blame others for all that is wrong rather than a society which
recognizes that, at least in some cases, responsibility must rest on the
individual.
In order to gain a proper objective (the inclusion of a discovery rule in the
Wrongful Death Act) Collins has negated a long standing body of the court's
own decisions and circumvented legislative intent. The shame of this decision
lies not in its result, but in its failure to take a more direct approach, consistent
with prior precedent, which would have achieved the same end.
Perhaps this conclusion is overly pessimistic. Hopefully, the court will strike
constitutionally infirm sections of H.B. 350 while affirming the validity of most
of its provisions. In the mean time, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers
presents the court with an opportunity to strike a proper balance between
deference to the General Assembly, the need to protect both innocent
consumers and innocent product manufacturers or sellers, the Constitution of
the State of Ohio, and the appropriate role of judicial review. Despite the
criticisms contained in this article, the court has far more often than not
displayed the ability to achieve this balance. Let us hope that this and future
decisions do not become foregone opportunities.
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